Religion Today
April 20 - 26, 2008
How to Treat the Dalai Lama: What China Could Learn
from Israel
Paul V.M. Flesher
Tibet is again in the news. Following
internal demonstrations against Chinese rule of Tibet that began in March,
Chinese forces arrested hundreds of Tibetans, expelled all foreign journalists,
and closed the borders.
In response, pro-Tibetan protestors have
disrupted Olympic Torch parades in Paris and San Francisco as the torch
processes from Greece to China for the Summer Olympics. While Tibetan exiles
blame politically repressive and economically unsuccessful Chinese policies,
the Chinese government itself blames the Dalai Lama, the 72-year-old monk who
leads the Tibetan government-in-exile.
China occupied Tibet in 1951 and after a
brutal crackdown in 1959 the Dalai Lama fled to India. Setting up a government
in exile, the Dalai Lama called for Tibetan independence from China and has
worked tirelessly since then to bring this about. Although the Dalai Lama's
calm demeanor and non-violent approach have earned him world-wide acclaim and a
Nobel Peace Prize, no world body argued Tibet's cause to the Chinese. Realizing
this, the Dalai Lama recently has promoted Tibetan autonomy under Chinese rule,
rather than independence, and sought negotiations with China.
Despite this moderation, China continues
to vilify the Dalai Lama. Just last week, Chinese President Hu Jintao laid the
blame for the troubles at the Dalai Lama's feet, despite the Lama's insistence
that he has had nothing to do with the disruptions. Hu said, "No
responsible government will sit idle for such crimes [of the Dalai Lama], which
gravely encroach human rights, gravely disrupt social order and gravely
jeopardize the life and property security of the masses." Hu rebuffed
calls from Western governments to negotiate with the Dalai Lama, claiming that
these actions show the Lama does not want to talk.
The Dalai Lama may be China's last best
opportunity to resolve its Tibetan problem, one that it should take while he
lives. Otherwise the situation may deteriorate drastically.
Hu's attitude toward the Dalai Lama is
much like recent Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's attitude toward the
now-deceased Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. Arafat, like the Dalai Lama,
spent much of his life outside his homeland, in his case, the Palestinian
Territories. In the 1960s, Arafat led first Fatah and then the Palestinian
Liberation Organization in terrorist attempts to free his people. These failed
and Arafat became known as an uncompromising enemy of Israel.
By 1988, however, Arafat moderated his
stance and moved to negotiation. He was allowed to enter the Territories after
agreeing to the Oslo Accords in 1994, became president, and began to work by
peaceful means toward an independent Palestinian state. Although younger
Palestinians had become radicalized under decades of Israeli occupation, the
now-moderate Arafat aimed to use his symbolic stature to bring them toward
peace.
When Ariel Sharon became president, he saw
Arafat's symbolic reputation as a threat and worked to eliminate it. Refusing
negotiations, Sharon used the Israeli army to destroy the apparatus of
Palestinian government, ultimately demolished the Palestinian capital,
Ramallah, and besieged Arafat in his own office for two years, ending in his
death. The last powerful Palestinian moderate had died.
Palestine's radical younger generation
elected the Islamist Hamas party, which kicked the remains of Arafat's party
out of the Gaza Strip, thereby eliminating any effective Palestinian
government. Although peace negations are now underway, the absence of Hamas
representatives makes a final settlement impossible. The radical Palestinians
simply will not agree.
The Dalai Lama stands in a position
similar to that of Arafat in the last years of his life. Starting from a much
less radical position as Arafat (the Dalai Lama has never been a terrorist), he
has moderated his position over the decades of Chinese occupation of Tibet. He
now seeks a middle way of negotiated autonomy rather than independence. He
hopes his powerful symbolic leadership can bring his people to agree to any
reasonable settlement that might be worked out.
However, it is already clear that younger
Tibetans, both in exile and in Tibet itself, have become radicalized. Many see
the Dalai Lama's strategy as ineffective and embrace violent means. They will
not serve as a negotiating partner once the Dalai Lama passes from the scene.
Instead, they will likely destabilize Tibet further and cause the Chinese
military to crack down even harder.
For the sake of Tibet's future and China's
future as its rulers, China should negotiate with the Dalai Lama while there is
still time.