Religion
Today
July 31 – August 6, 2005
Commanding Morality
Paul V.M. Flesher
It is a
tenant of Christian belief that the moral values which God commanded are
"good." By this I do not mean to say that they are a "good
job" or that they were "done well" or that God should receive a
gold star for creating them. No, I mean that according to Christian belief,
God's ethics represent the highest form of good possible. They are the epitome
of moral values; it is impossible for a better moral system to exist.
Of course,
in the modern world we disagree with specific moral rules and no longer
practice some of them, such as the rules about slavery and divorce. Indeed,
fewer than half of the Ten Commandments are encoded in
From this
viewpoint, it is interesting to ask this question: Is God's morality good
because He commanded it, or did He command it because it was good? This is a
difficult question, and different forms of Christianity have answered in
different ways. It is so difficult that many forms of Christianity have refused
to address it. It is a conundrum for all monotheistic religions, including
Judaism and Islam.
The
conundrum is this: while all Christian and monotheistic believers happily
affirm that God and his ethics are good, the possible answers to the question
require the affirmation of a second point, and that point is less willingly
accepted. There are two possible points, one for each answer to the question,
and both are uncomfortable for monotheists.
If God's
morality is good because He commanded it, then that means that whatever He
commanded would have been equally good. He could have commanded anything and it
would have been just as good. God could have decreed that Wednesday, instead of
the Sabbath, was the holy day. And that would be good.
He could have decreed that murder or theft were good.
Our ethical
and moral sense, therefore, comes from God's commands. If he had commanded
something else, then Christian moral sensibilities would be different. It is
rather uncomfortable to think that Christian morality was open to all
possibilities before God uttered His commands, and that He arbitrarily chose to
declare some actions good and some actions evil.
The
alternative answer to our question resolves this problem, but only by creating
another one. If God commanded Christian morality because it was good, that
means that each rule in it has an essence of goodness. Due to its inherent
nature, then, and not because God said it, each command is good in and of
itself. When all moral rules are taken together, that means there is a standard
of goodness that is independent of God. The standard did not come from God,
because then it would evidence the problem of arbitrariness and actually be the
answer discussed above. Instead, this moral standard exists apart from God, and
existed before God commanded the Jewish and Christian moral rules.
The problem
this causes for Christianity, indeed for any monotheism, is that it creates
something ultimate that is not God. It also implies that God is not omnipotent
in the area of morality, but consults the standard to ensure the goodness of
his moral rules. To be sure, the goodness standard is not a second god, and so
does not require the conclusion of polytheism. But it does mean that God is not
alone and that He did not create goodness, but instead followed a pre-existing
standard of inherent good.
Of course,
this theological conundrum has no impact on the specific character of
Christianity's moral rules. Its ethical demands remain the same whichever
answer one takes, and even if one chooses not to address the question. For in
the end, Christianity believes, God's morality requires obedience, not
understanding.
Thanks to
James Rachel's The Elements of Moral Philosophy (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1986). For information, see the section on Divine
Command Theory.
Dr. Flesher is director of UW's Religious Studies
Program.
More information about the program, as well as past
columns, can be found on the Web at www.uwyo.edu/relstds/index.htm.